John of St. Thomas on Universal and Peaceful Acceptance

Quick Introduction

As I write this, we are mere hours away from the first bout of smoke, which will rise from the chimney of the Sistine Chapel, signifying if a Pope has been chosen or not to lead us. In anticipation of a new Pope, and new controversies, I wish to relay the traditional Thomist teaching on the topic of Universal and Peaceful Acceptance. Universal and Peaceful Acceptance is the concept which states that, since there was a universal and peaceful acceptance of the pontiff, then the pontiff's legitimacy is infallibly certain. Some Sedevacantists concede this point, while arguing that there wasn't a universal and peaceful acceptance of John XXIII, Paul VI, etc. On the other hand, other Sedevacantist groups deny the principle outright. Regardless, the "most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas," John of St. Thomas, says this about the concept in his Cursus Theologicus. I sourced the text itself from an acquaintance, who did all the translating and arduous work of converting it to markdown. You can find the source here, which contains many other medieval and Baroque authors on the concept of UPA.

Quaestio 1, Disputatio 7, Articulus 2 (Q. 1, D. 7, A. 2)

Whether, after a legitimate election of a pontiff, it is of faith per se primo, or per se secundo that this particular person, for example Innocent X, is pope?

I. This question has become very celebrated in these times, and has been discussed with various arguments, for little can be found among the ancients in the exact terms in which it is now disputed. Before we propose those matters which create difficulty in this area, two terms must be explained which are proposed or presupposed in the title. The first is the phrase "given a legitimate election"; the second is the phrase "of faith per se primo, or per se secundo." And as to the first, we suppose that a papal election can be not legitimate, but doubtful or flawed, not only if it is conducted by illegitimate electors, that is, by persons to whom the right of electing has not been given by the Church or the Pope (for then there is no doubt that it is not an election but a violent usurpation), but even if it is conducted by legitimate electors, that is, by the Cardinals, to whom this power is now entrusted in the Church. Concerning this, however, there may be some difficulty as to whether an election celebrated by Cardinals can be vitiated. For, first, it cannot be vitiated on the part of the electors, because Cardinals cannot be impeded from the right of election by any censure. This is a singular privilege of the election of the Supreme Pontiff, as is expressly stated in the Clementine [Constitution] Ne Romani §. Caeterum de electione, where it is decreed that no Cardinal can be repelled from that election on the pretext of excommunication or censure. This was established to avoid schisms and uncertainty of election, upon which depends the direction and governance of the entire Church. Therefore, by the very fact that Cardinals participate in the election, it cannot be invalidated on the part of the electors. Furthermore, neither can it be vitiated on the part of the election itself nor rendered doubtful, on account of the assistance of the Holy Spirit in conducting that election. For many consider this assistance to be given with probability, and it is especially confirmed by a certain testimony of Sixtus V in Constitution L, where, treating of Cardinals, he says among other things: "That in that sacred election they are to be considered true interpreters and mediators of the divine will, by whose Spirit, just as the entire body of the Church is sanctified and governed, so most certainly it is entirely certain and clear to all that this whole work of such an election is completed by His inspiration and instinct." Here the Pontiff attributes a certain special assistance of the Holy Spirit to that election, which is not attributed to other works or common actions, for this assistance is compared to that by which the body of the Church is governed and sanctified by the Spirit. But from this assistance, it is established that the Church cannot err; therefore, from the same [assistance], we must hold that an election made by Cardinals cannot err or be rendered invalid. Otherwise, it would not have special assistance if it sometimes errs and fails, and sometimes does not, for that is found in any other action.

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IV. To that which is objected concerning the assistance of the Holy Spirit in the election of the pontiff, it is answered that the pontiff does not say that infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit is always due to that election, such that the electors can never err; since from the laws cited above, the opposite is inferred. Rather, he says that the work of election is completed by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, that is, when such an election is consummated and peacefully accomplished. For as long as it remains doubtful, it is not completed, but something still remains unresolved. Therefore, when it is completed, it happens by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, that is, by His special providence and assistance by which He governs that work of election, in the manner by which He specially rules the Church. For there are many things which are ordained or done by the special providence of God and assistance of the Holy Spirit, and yet they do not have infallible indefectibility such that such assistance is always given, ensuring they never lack it, but rather that they elect concordantly and properly, since no promise has been made concerning this. Nor does Sixtus proceed definitively in those words, but narratively to uphold the dignity of the cardinals, as is evident from the text. Therefore, the present question does not proceed from the certainty by which this person is believed to be the pontiff absolutely and by any election whatsoever, but presupposes a legitimate election, without which it cannot fall under faith that this person is the pontiff. Nor is it inappropriate for something to fall under faith based on a certain supposition as a required condition, just as for something to be defined as a matter of faith, it is necessary that disputation and investigation precede it, as was done in the Council of the Apostles, Acts 15, and yet this investigation and disputation does not pertain to faith but is presumed to have preceded as a condition.

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X. Let this be the conclusion: It is of divine faith immediately that this particular man who has been duly elected and accepted by the Church is the Supreme Pontiff and successor of Peter, not only in himself but also for us, although it is much more manifested to us when the pontiff actually defines something. No Catholic dissents from this conclusion in practice and in its exercise, although in theory and speculatively they may think they do not believe it by divine faith. In this conclusion, two things must be done. First, to explain it; then, to prove it from its foundations, especially from the authority according to which we believe this particular man to be the pope. Indeed, the explanation of this conclusion, in my view, depends especially on three points. First, that the one elected as pope is elected as a rule of faith such that just as a canonical book of Scripture is a certain written rule of faith, so the man elected as pope is a certain living rule of faith. Second, that the Church has been commissioned by Christ the Lord to elect for itself a man who for the time being is such a rule, as we have shown above, and consequently the same Church has been commissioned through its acceptance to determine that he has been canonically and legitimately elected; so that just as it pertains to the pontiff and the Church to determine which books are canonical, so it also pertains to it to determine which man is elected as the canon and living rule of faith. Third, that this matter, namely that this man has been duly elected and canonically made the rule of faith, is a matter determinable by the Church as a matter of faith.

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XIV. Next, secondly, it is demonstrated that the same conclusion is de fide both in itself and with respect to us by virtue of an election peacefully accepted by the Church. There are two things that the Church accepts in a pontiff: first, that here and now in particular he is an infallible rule of faith; second, that it accepts him as the head to whom the universal Church is united. And thus, having accepted him, it makes this proposition to be de fide, for it is impossible that the Church should err in accepting any rule of faith—whether it be the definition of a Council, or some canonical book, or some tradition—and that by accepting it as a rule of faith, it should not be de fide that it is a true and legitimate rule. Therefore, it is likewise impossible that the Church should err in accepting a Supreme Pontiff in particular, since it accepts him as the supreme and living rule in proposing matters of faith. The antecedent, besides what has been said, is evident because if it is not certain according to faith that this particular book is canonical, or that this definition is a legitimate definition, we cannot be certain about the matters defined or transmitted in a canonical book. Nor is this similar to one who proximately proposes or preaches matters of faith, whom we are not bound to believe de fide to be a legitimate minister of the Gospel, because he who preaches the Gospel and proposes matters of faith does not function as a determinative rule of matters of faith, but only as a minister intimating to others those things which are to be believed. Hence, others who believe are not moved by his authority, but by the credibility of those things which are proposed, and unless they are sufficiently proposed so that their credibility becomes known to the hearer, he is not obliged to believe. But the pontiff proposes matters to be believed as a rule of faith and as a judge determining what must be believed, and thus by his authority man is obliged to believe. It is therefore necessary that the faithful be certain that he who defines and regulates matters of faith has the authority to regulate and define them; otherwise, if it should happen that one doubts the authority which this particular definer has, one cannot be certain that the matters remain defined de fide—just as if one doubts whether some canonical book is truly canonical, there cannot remain certainty concerning those things which are contained in it. XV. The second [principle] that the Church universally accepts is that he [the Pope] is her head, as she unites herself to him as the supreme visible head and subjects herself to him. For it is not sufficient that the Church subject herself to whoever is rightly elected as pontiff in a general sense, but she must be united and subject to a visible head; and this is not visible unless it is determined in particular. Therefore, it is necessary that the Church subject herself to and unite with this particular person as head. The Church accomplishes this subjection and union by the very fact that she peacefully accepts the election made in this specific person or that one. But this itself is to determine infallibly that this man is the head of the Church, since indeed in practice the whole Church unites herself to him as head and recognizes him as such. The whole Church cannot err in this matter; therefore, in the very exercise [of this recognition], the Church determines that this man is her head, such that those who hold the opposite view are schismatics. For there can be no greater determination that someone is pontiff than that the universal Church recognizes and accepts him as pontiff. It is the same thing for the universal Church to say explicitly, "This man is truly and legitimately pontiff," as for the universal Church to say it implicitly through her actual practice by uniting and subjecting herself to him as head. Since this determination concerns a matter of faith—namely, that this universal Church is united to her visible head in particular, without which everything we believe about the Church (that she is true here and now, and catholic) collapses—it is necessary that this determination of the Church regarding such a matter, by recognizing this man as the supreme rule, is a determination of faith.

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XVIII. Nor can it be said that the definitions of Councils, as they are made by any particular Council, or the definitions of popes, as they proceed from this particular pope, are not matters of faith because they are made by these particular authorities (since it may happen that some Council is not a true Council), but rather because they are accepted by the Church, and therefore it suffices to believe with moral certainty that this particular pope or this particular Council has that authority. But against this: the Church does not have greater authority to make matters of faith through its acceptance than this particular Council or pontiff has through his definition; indeed, the whole Church, according to its authority, is represented in the Council. Therefore, the determining and declaring factor that something is a matter of faith is not the acceptance of the Church, but the definition of the Council or the pope. Nor did Christ the Lord promise infallibility and indefectibility of faith to the acceptance of the Church itself, but to Peter himself and his successors. Therefore, the confirmation of the faith does not rest on the Church's acceptance, but on Peter's confirmation. Indeed, the Council, in which the whole Church is authoritatively present, seeks confirmation in determinations of faith from the pontiff himself for that time and considered in particular. Therefore, the confirmation of faith does not occur through the acceptance of the Church, but through the definition of the pope. And finally, if the acceptance of the Church makes something a matter of faith, even if a particular Council or a particular legitimate pontiff did not exist, then the acceptance of the Church, by which it peacefully accepts some man as pontiff and as a rule of faith, also makes it a matter of faith that this man is pope, since this is a matter that can be believed through faith, just as it is believable about any rule of faith that it is a legitimate rule, as we have shown. Therefore, the acceptance of the Church in this matter, which is of faith since it cannot err, renders it a matter of faith.

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XXVII. But if you should say that the electors do not propose this proposition to the Church as something to be believed, but merely declare the person elected, and that the pontiff himself, as soon as he defines or determines anything, by that very act proposes himself as the living rule and supreme head of the Church; against this is the fact that before the pontiff defines anything, by the very fact that he is elected, it should be no less certain that he is pope than after he defines something. Indeed, even before any definition or act that he might perform, he is the visible head of the Church peacefully elected, such that the Church is bound to maintain union with him, and any church that would not accept him would not be the true Church, but schismatic. Therefore, it is necessary that before any act proceeding from the pontiff himself, there be some foundation of certainty of faith concerning that proposition, and consequently that it be proposed as a matter of faith by some infallible proposer. However, this is not given, since it is only proposed by the electors, who do not have the authority of an infallible rule concerning any proposition of faith, for they have no greater authority than a general Council before the definition of the pope, which nevertheless can err, especially if not all agree or follow the instruction of the pontiff, nor do they propose that election as something to be held as a matter of faith, that it was duly performed: therefore. If you should say that these conditions are known to the Church not from the declaration or proposition of the electors, but from the very evidence of the fact, because it does not appear that the election was not peaceful, and therefore the Church thus accepts it—against this is the fact that no one besides the electors sees all those conditions which are established by law to be observed, but that remains secret among them; therefore this is not known to the accepting Church from the evidence of the fact, but from the declaration of the electors. And although the election may appear to be peaceful, it nevertheless does not appear whether it is peaceful from the true observance of all conditions, or from the inadvertence of the electors, or from their agreement to deceive by proposing as legitimately elected one who was not elected, or by proceeding with some simony, etc. Nor can it be said that God would not permit the Church to be deceived in such a case. For although this may be piously believed, there is nevertheless no infallible promise about this, nor is it a matter of faith that God would never permit this, especially since it was widely received in the Church, and approved by many, that a certain woman was once elected as pontiff, in which case it also had to be admitted that a peaceful election, accepted by the Church, could contain an error invalidating it, and consequently it is not certain as a matter of faith that God does not sometimes permit the Church, in receiving an election, and the electors, in peacefully proposing it, to err; for if this were a matter of faith, it would also be a matter of faith that the history of the female pontiff was false, which no one claims.

XXVIII. We respond that regarding all those conditions, and the intention and truthfulness of the electors, these are not immediately known by faith, because the acceptance and definition of the Church is not immediately concerned with these matters, but they are known mediately and by consequence. What is immediately known by faith is that one who is elected by those persons designated by the Church for this ministry, who elect the pontiff in her person, by the very fact that he is accepted by the Church as legitimately elected, is the pontiff. This is because the definition of Martin V stated above, and the Church's acceptance, are concerned with this matter. From this, mediately and by consequence, it is inferred that if it is a matter of faith that this elected person is the pontiff, then all things required for this have been observed. But faith is not primarily and per se concerned with the requirements themselves and the conditions present in the electors, and then subsequently with the elected person himself. Similarly, in the definitions of Councils, faith is not concerned with those things that are prerequisites for such a definition, namely that diligent inquiry or disputation concerning the propositions to be defined has preceded it. Faith is not given concerning this, but nevertheless, once the definition is made, it is rightly inferred through theological consequence that all requirements for the definition were in place, and consequently that the disputation preceded it. And the reason for this is that when something is per se a matter of faith, it is not necessary that those things which have a necessary connection with such a truth of faith are also matters of faith. Indeed, a theological conclusion consists in this: that it deals with those things which have a necessary connection and consequence with those things which are of faith. For example, it is a theological conclusion that "Christ is a man; therefore Christ can laugh," because the ability to laugh has a necessary connection with being human. Similarly, since it is a matter of faith that this particular man canonically elected according to the acceptance of the Church is the pontiff, it is inferred by theological consequence that he was elected by true electors, with true intention, and that all other requisites without which that truth cannot stand were present. Thus, through faith or revelation implicitly contained in the creed and in the promise made to Peter, and made more explicit in the definition of Martin V, and applied and declared in practice through the acceptance of the Church, it is only established that this particular person canonically elected according to the acceptance of the Church is the pontiff. The other things that are necessarily prerequisite to or follow from such an election are inferred by theological consequence from that proposition of faith, and are believed mediately. XXIX. To the confirmation it is answered that the Church accepts as a matter of faith both the election and the elected, insofar as it accepts him as the infallible rule of faith and as the supreme head to whom it is united, and upon whose union with the Church depends the unity of the Church itself. And when it is said that this must be proposed to the Church by some proposer, it is answered that the election and the elected are proposed by the Cardinals not in their own person, but in the person and by the authority of the Church, by which the power of electing and declaring the elected has been entrusted to them. Hence, in this regard and with respect to this office, they are the Church representatively, for just as bishops legitimately assembled by the Pope are the Church representatively, so too the Cardinals, or whatever other electors legitimately designated by the Church or by the Pope, are the Church representatively for the purpose of electing the head of the Church and the successor of Peter. And just as the Pontiff so assembles the bishops in Council that the confirmation and final judgment in matters of faith depends on him, so too the congregation of Cardinals so elects and declares the elected Pontiff that the Church, by accepting him—of which Cardinals they are ministers—ultimately confirms as a matter of faith that this man is truly the supreme rule of faith and the Supreme Pontiff. Hence, if the Cardinals elect doubtfully, the Church can correct their election, as was determined in the Council of Constance, session XLI. Therefore, even before any definition by the Pontiff himself, through the Church's acceptance alone that proposition becomes a matter of faith, as has been explained—not because of the Church's acceptance in any manner whatsoever, but in a matter pertaining to faith, since he is accepted as the determined rule of faith. And when it is said that nothing of the conditions required for election is seen externally, but this happens only among the electors in whose declaration and statement the Church accepts the Pontiff, it is answered that it is not required that all those conditions, and the election itself, and the intention of the electors be seen, but they are assumed to have been done in a moral way, because they see the electors gathered for the act of election, and peacefully proposing the elected, and declaring him without any reasonable doubt intervening; for this suffices for the Church to universally accept him, and once this acceptance is made, that truth becomes a matter of faith. For it is not required that something be a matter of faith, that all conditions prerequisite to it be seen, but it suffices that they be established with moral certainty beforehand, and afterwards certainty concerning them is had through theological consequence.

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XXXVII. the third way, similarly, it cannot be said that there is certainty of this proposition as a matter of faith, for before the elected pontiff exercises any act whatsoever, by the very fact that he has been elected, the Church is bound to accept him as legitimate head, so that whoever does not accept him is regarded as schismatic. Therefore, the Church ought to be no less certain that this person is pope after he exercises any act than before, since if it were not then certain that this particular man was pope, neither would it be certain that this specific Church, which accepts him as head and universal pastor, is the true Church, for in order for the Church to be true, it must be united to its true and legitimate pontiff, otherwise it will not be true. Wherefore, if before any act of the pontiff there is sufficient obligation to accept him as pope, similarly there will be sufficient obligation to believe that he is the true pope in particular. And furthermore, before the pontiff defines anything, in order for me to assent to the defined truth, I must judge that he who defines is the infallible rule of faith, for as long as this judgment is not formed, I cannot be certain about those things which he defines. Therefore, we say that it must be a matter of faith that this particular man is the Supreme Pontiff, because since this particular man is the rule of faith, it is necessary that it be infallible that he cannot err, and that he has the authority to define, so that what he defines is infallible. It is therefore necessary to form the judgment that this is the Supreme Pontiff in particular before I assent to the definition given by him. Thus, the definition which the pontiff makes, or the act which he exercises, cannot be the reason and motive for assenting to this truth that he is the pontiff, since in order to assent to such a definition, it must be presupposed that he is the pontiff. Hence, a circular argument and begging the question would be committed if I assent to the definition because I assent that the one defining is the pope, and if I assent that he is the pope because he defines.

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XL. You will only ask at what time this acceptance by the Church begins to be sufficiently valid so as to render that proposition a matter of faith: whether by the very fact that the Cardinals present the elected person to those faithful who are in the place of election, or when it has already been sufficiently promulgated throughout the whole world and the Church spread everywhere. It is answered that, as we stated above, the unanimous election and declaration by the Cardinals is like a definition made by bishops in a legitimately convened Council, while the acceptance by the Church is, as far as we are concerned, like a confirmation of such declaration. Moreover, this acceptance is understood to occur both negatively—immediately when the Church, wherever it knows of such an election, does not contradict it—and positively when it is immediately accepted by the prelates of the Church who are present there, and gradually in other parts of the world it is also admitted by other prelates, such that those who see or hear of the Pope-elect, and observe that he is not being contradicted, are immediately bound to believe that he is the Pope and to accept him.

XLI. Finally, to the objection raised concerning that syllogism: "Every duly elected person is pontiff; this person is duly elected; therefore, he is pontiff," where the minor premise functions not only as a condition but as a premise influencing the conclusion, etc., it is answered that some hold the opinion that it influences only as a required condition. They hold that the proposition "This man is pontiff" is contained as immediately under that universal proposition "Every duly elected person is pontiff" as the proposition "Peter is mortal" is contained, equally as a matter of faith, under "Every man is mortal," although it is required as a condition that Peter be generated and be a man—which, however, is not known by faith but through natural knowledge. It seems to me, however, that a distinction must be made: if by the proposition "This man is duly elected," we understand through the phrase "duly elected" not only an election properly conducted but also particularly accepted by the Church, then it is a proposition of faith that "This man is duly elected," just as it is a proposition of faith, once a definition has been made by a Council, that "that definition is legitimate." And once a book has been approved as canonical, it is a matter of faith that it is approved and is canonical, because it is accepted as an infallible rule of faith. Nor does it create a numerical distinction to say "This man is duly elected" and "This man is pontiff," because acceptance as supreme pontiff and being supreme pontiff are the same thing—just as something being defined and a definition being legitimate do not constitute a numerical distinction. If, however, by the phrase "duly elected" we understand that all the required conditions have been applied so that the election is legitimate prior to the Church's acceptance, then I say that proposition is characterized by moral certainty and influences the truth "This man is pontiff," not only as a premise that infers, but as a disposition for him to be pontiff and to be accepted as such. And then the meaning is: "Every duly elected person is pontiff," that is, "Everyone who is elected with the proper conditions ought to be accepted as pontiff; this person is so elected; therefore, he ought to be accepted." In the first sense, however, both propositions are matters of faith, namely: "Everyone duly elected and accepted is pontiff" and "This person is duly elected and accepted," etc., as shown above.

XLII. Finally, it is argued: Because that is immediately of faith, the opposite of which is manifest heresy. But one who denies that this man is not the pope is not a heretic, but only schismatic; therefore, one who affirms that he is the pope does not assent from faith. The minor premise is evident, for those who refuse to recognize this man as pontiff, and deny him obedience, are schismatics, because they divide the unity of the Church, or of its head, yet they are not heretics. Otherwise, schism would never differ from heresy, although it is established that schism opposes charity, while heresy opposes faith, as St. Thomas teaches in [Summa Theologica] 2-2, question 39, or opposes peace, which is the effect of charity. For schism always denies that this particular individual is pope, refusing to obey him and establishing another head; but if it were a matter of faith that: "This particular man is pontiff," whoever did not recognize him, but denied him to be pope, would at least in the external forum be judged a heretic, because he would be denying what he was bound to believe as a matter of faith, namely that: "This man is pope."

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XLIV. We respond that whoever would deny this man to be pope after he has been peacefully and canonically accepted, would be not only schismatic but also heretical. For such a person would not merely rend the unity of the Church like those who from the beginning elect two pontiffs (regarding whom it is unknown which is the true pontiff), but would also add a perverse dogma, because he denies that one whom the Church has accepted should be held as pontiff and as the rule of faith. Hence in these matters, that which Jerome teaches in his commentary on the third chapter of Titus applies, and from him St. Thomas in Secunda Secundae, question 39, article 1, ad tertium, that there is no schism which does not fabricate for itself some heresy, so that it might appear to have rightly withdrawn from the Church. Thus, although schism is distinguished from heresy, nevertheless it is most often joined with heresy and prepares the way for it, and in the present case, whoever would deny that proposition would be not purely schismatic, but also heretical, which Suarez also judges in the above-mentioned passage in his response to the fourth objection.

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